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AMERICAN CONCEPT OF FEDERAL UNION 
AND ITS WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE
United States were established as a federation. The concept of federalism as a way of organizing a system 
of government proved to be a very powerful one and highly attractive. It was adopted in a number 
of countries all over the world. Because the concept of a federal union is a genuinely American every 
federal constitution is to some extent modeled on the American example, although some of them in 
much greater degree than the others. Contemporary federal systems vary enormously and there are 
many reasons why the American constitution could not be simply copied in not one of modern federa­
tions. None the less, the principles of the American constitution where they concern federalism - such 
as division of power between separated orders of government, direct representation of the constituent 
parts in the national legislature or their participation in the procedure of amending the constitution 
- were adopted in each of them. Thus, federalism can be seen as a significant American contribution 
to the theory of constitutionalism, even if it failed or was rejected outright - or after short period - in 
some countries and had to be significantly adjusted to local circumstances in the others. 
Inventing federalism
Separation from Britain resulted in the establishment of thirteen independent states in 
place of the former colonies, some of them having declared their independence even 
before the unanimous Declaration of Independence was passed by Continental Con­
gress and announced on the 4th of July 1776. The states had thought together during the 
War of Independence. Nevertheless, they remained fully independent and sovereign 
both during the war and afterwards. Therefore, the states preceded the Union, which 
was in turn their creation. 1 They were formally bound together only by the Articles of 
1 There is an ongoing debate among historians whether the Union was created by the states or whether the 
states were the creation of the Union. For the arguments supporting the first thesis see Raoul Berger. 1987. 
Federalism. The Founders’ Design. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 21-47; the opposite 
position is taken, for example, by J. N. Rakove. See Jack N. Rakove. 1997. Original Meanings. Politics and 
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution. New York: Vintage Books, 163-168. It seems that the arguments 
presented in favor of the first position, that is that the states preceded the Union and that after the War of 
Independence they remained fully independent entities, are based on much stronger foundations. After 
all, even Alexander Hamilton, who can hardly be classified as a states’ rights supporter, admitted that “the 
State governments by their original constitutions [were] invested with complete sovereignty. ” The Federalist 
no. 32. In Clinton Rossiter (ed. ). Federalist Papers. 2003. New York: Signet Classic, 192. 
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Confederation and Perpetual Union, which established a rather loose confederation 
in early 1781 when the Articles were finally ratified by all of the states. The Articles 
did not change the status of the states as sovereign entities. According to Article II, 
each one of them, being part of a confederation, retained “its sovereignty, freedom and 
independence. ”2 3After the war was over the Confederation was not dissolved and, at 
least formally, existed until 1789. However, it proved not to be an adequate solution for 
the problems that the newly established American republics were facing. 
2 Act of Confederation of the United States of America. In Charles L. Gammon. 2005. The Continental Con­
gress. Americas Forgotten Government. Baltimore: PublishAmerica, 38. 
3 Carl J. Friedrich. 1960. Origin and Development of the Concept of Federalism in the United States. 
Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts, 9, 32. 
4 As T. Hueglin correctly points out, “the Federalists’ interpretation constituted a deliberate and radical 
break with that tradition. This may already be evidenced by the fact that their account of the three very 
same historical examples, in the nineteenth and twentieth Federalist Papers, is entirely negative. The rea­
son given is the same in each instance: the lack of supreme central authority in these confederacies leads 
to ‘imbecility’ in governmental and social affairs. ” Thomas Hueglin. 2003. Federalism at the Crossroads: 
Old Meanings, New Significance. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 36, 276. 
The concept of a federal union based on completely different principles, both from 
those on which earlier confederations (including the American confederation established 
by the Articles) were formed and those governing the operation of centralized states with 
one sovereign power, as it emerged from the Philadelphia convention was a compromise 
between two opposing conceptions presented at the convention and exemplified in the 
Virginia Plan, on the one hand, and in the New Jersey Plan on the other. Federalism 
thus “emerged as a compromise between those who were prepared to give the national 
government limitless superiority, entrusting the federal legislature with the power to 
interpret the constitution at will, and those who would keep the federal government 
weak in order to protect the autonomy of the several states. ” The opposing views were 
merged into a new concept of federalism “which combined a strong, presidential execu­
tive, two houses of Congress of which one represented the nation and the other the states 
[and] a judicial guardian of the federal constitution (... ) It was a concept not limited to 
defense and security as the purpose and end of federal union. ”’
The Founders rejected the older tradition of confederacies as an inadequate solu­
tion for the American states, giving each time the same reason: lack of strong central 
authority. This deliberate rejection provides another argument to support the view 
that federalism was a genuine innovation and not just another stage in the process of 
developing an idea that originated in the ancient times. 4
The emergence of strong central authority in a confederation or a league was impos­
sible for the reason that this authority depended entirely on confederation members. 
Confederation could not legislate directly on the citizenry nor execute its decisions 
in any other way than via the member states. Even if it was possible theoretically it 
was definitely not in practice. Decisions made by confederal authority were binding 
only for the member states as collective capacities. The federal union established by 
the Constitution differed from such arrangements in one crucial aspect. It was to 
consist both of the states as separate political entities and of the individuals of whom 
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the states consisted. Therefore the newly established federal government would be 
able both to legislate directly on the population (in its proper domain) and to execute 
its laws independently of the states. This aspect of a constitutional plan was stressed 
by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist no. 15, where he first called the principle of 
legislation for states or governments “the great and radical vice in the construction 
of the (...) Confederation,” and then stated that for the establishment of a national 
government it is essential “to incorporate” into its plan “those ingredients which may 
be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a gov­
ernment.” It was necessary to have an extension of “the authority of the Union to the 
persons or the citizens - the only proper object of government.”5 The Framers were 
thus less concerned with broadening the objects of national government, and instead 
they concentrated their attention on securing that the government would be able to 
execute its powers independently of the states. For this reason two clauses were intro­
duced to the Constitution, one authorizing the national government to collect taxes, 
and another, which later became famous “necessary and proper” clause, authorizing the 
national legislature to “enact all laws necessary and proper to execute its powers and 
those vested in the other branches of government.”6 The Constitution was not shifting 
the balance of power in the Union (although national legislature was after all vested 
in some powers that Continental Congress lacked, such as regulation of commerce) 
in as much as altering the nature of relations between the national government and 
the states. It was stressed by James Madison that “the new Constitution (...) consists 
much less in the addition of NEW POWERS TO the Union than in the invigoration 
of its ORIGINAL POWERS.”7
5 The Federalist no. 15. In Clinton Rossiter (ed.), op.cit., 103, 105.
6 Jack N. Rakove, op.cit., p. 179.
7 The Federalist no. 45. In Clinton Rossiter (ed.), op.cit., 289, 290.
8 Harry N. Scheiber. 2001. American Federalism as a Working System and as a Constitutional Model. In 
Jürgen Rose, Johannes Ch. Traut (eds.). Federalism and Decentralization. Perspectives for the Transforma­
tion Process in Eastern and Central Europe. Hamburg: LIT, 53.
’ Forrest McDonald. 1985. Novus Ordo Seclorum. The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 262.
Federalism, unlike the doctrine of separation of powers or even republicanism, 
the established concepts with a strong theoretical foundation, was not “received from 
political theory or from historic jurisprudence.” It was a wholly new idea, invented by 
the Founders out of necessity. “Constructing a theory of federalism was the only way in 
which the Framers could have successfully sold the new governmental proposal to the 
states.”8 Federalism is an American invention, for never before had such a governmental 
structure existed, one that merged strong national power with the autonomic status 
of the constituent parts. Introducing such a concept demanded redefinition of “most 
of the terms in which the theory and ideology of civic humanism has been discussed.” 
Federalism as introduced by the Framers was thus an “entirely new concept,” its devel­
opment equaled with creating “a novus ordo seclorum: a new order of the ages.”9
The concept of a federal union first and foremost challenged the traditional notion 
of sovereignty, brought in by J. Bodin and T. Hobbes. For both of them there could be 
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only one sovereign power in the polity, as sovereignty was indivisible and therefore 
could not be exercised by multiple subjects.
The problem of sovereignty was central not only in the age of constitution-making 
but also long after that. In fact, it was ultimately settled in the second half of the 19lh 
century on the battlefields of the Civil War. This only proves that it was tremendously 
difficult to change the traditional view of sovereignty as an indivisible attribute of power, 
that could, according to this view, belong either to the Union or to the states, but by no 
means to both. This concept was, however, successfully challenged by the Framers. The 
federal union of a new kind established by the Constitution was to provide a novel idea 
of sovereignty, which still remained indivisible but at the same time was converted into 
dual or shared. For A. Hamilton it was abundantly clear that the Union and the states 
could not simultaneously be fully sovereign (in the traditional meaning of the term), 
and that the sovereign Union could not consist of completely independent states. This 
“political monster of an imperium in imperio,” as he called it, constituted a “funda­
mental error” in the structure of Confederation.10 The federal union, as proposed in 
the Constitution, was not to deprive the states of their sovereignty, but instead was to 
make them a part of the national sovereignty: “The proposed Constitution, so far from 
implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the 
national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves 
in their position certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.”11 In 
the same spirit, J. Madison rejected the objections of the “adversaries of the proposed 
Constitution” who claimed that it had created not a federal but a consolidated govern­
ment. For J. Madison the “proposed government” could not be “deemed a national 
one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the 
several states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”12
10 The Federalist no. 15, 103 .
" The Federalist no. 9. In Clinton Rossiter (ed.), op.cit., 71.
12 The Federalist no. 39. In Clinton Rossiter (ed.), op.cit., 242.
13 Ibidem.
In the passages cited above we find two crucial features of a federal system of gov­
ernment. The first is the division of powers between general (federal) government and 
the federated entities. The second is the direct representation of those entities in the 
institutions of the federal government. Both of them were hallmarks of this new idea of 
a sovereign power, not concentrated at the centre but shared among multiple subjects 
and exercised in accordance by all of them. The idea of shared sovereignty can also 
be seen in the way that the Constitution could be amended. To amend the constitu­
tion both the participation of the national legislature and the states, acting as a whole 
entity and not through their citizens, is necessary. If the Union were the sole sovereign, 
then participation of the states in the amending procedure would not be required. As 
J. Madison noted, “the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of 
the people of the Union”13 as in a consolidated, national government.
The Founders were aware that the Constitution created a federal union of a new 
kind. The most thorough study where differences between the Union as proposed by 
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the constitutional scheme and then-known forms of government (confederacies and 
consolidated governments) are discussed is provided by J. Madison, and can be found 
in the famous Federalist no. 39.'4 His analysis consists of five elements that decide the 
true character of the government: the foundation on which it is to be established; 
the sources from which its powers are to be drawn; the operation of those pow­
ers; the extent of those powers; the authority by which changes in the government 
can be introduced.* 15 Detailed investigation in each of those areas led J. Madison to 
the conclusion that the Constitution was “neither a national nor a federal (...) but 
a composition of both.”16 Of course J. Madison used the word “federal” as opposed 
to “national.” thus with its older meaning when it described arrangements such as 
the Confederation established by the Articles. Its meaning changed later when the 
supporters of the Constitution called themselves Federalists. What is noteworthy, 
however, is that it appears to be more than clear that J. Madison was fully aware of the 
fact that the Constitution had created a completely new form of government unknown 
before, “unprecedented under the sun.”17 His conclusions could not be more plain in 
this respect. He sums up his observations on the Constitution by pointing out that 
it was “in its foundation (...) federal, not national; in the sources from which the 
ordinary powers of the government [were] drawn, it [was] partly federal and partly 
national; in the operation of these powers, it [was] national not federal; in the extent 
of them, again, it [was] federal, not national; and, finally in the authoritative mode of 
introducing amendments, it [was] neither wholly federal nor wholly national.”18 The 
Constitution was therefore for J. Madison a blend of federal and national.19 The new 
American system was neither a confederation composed of independent states nor 
a centralized, consolidated government with one supreme authority. Instead, “it was 
a mixture of both.”20
'* For a general discussion of J. Madisons views expressed in the essay, see Francis R. Greene. 1994. Madi­
sons View of Federalism. In “The Federalist," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 24, 49-51.
15 Ibidem, 239.
16 Ibidem, 242.
17 Forrest McDonald, op.cit., 276.
18 The Federalist, no. 39, 242-243.
15 Garrett Ward Sheldon. 2001. The Political Philosophy of James Madison. Baltimore: John Hopkins Uni­
versity Press, 67.
20 Forrest McDonald, op.cit., 276.
The federal system enshrined in the Constitution had five main characteristics 
making it an original constitutional construction. These were: division of powers 
between the federal government and the states; autonomy of the states as to their inter­
nal organization (limited to some extent primarily by the supremacy clause); direct 
representation of the states in the federal government via the Senate and their role in 
the process of presidential elections; constitutional amendment procedure in which 
both the federal legislature and the states had to be involved; procedure for resolving 
disputes between the national government and the states. The last point was one of the 
most problematic for the Founders. J. Madison was originally in favor of giving to the 
Congress the right to negate the state laws. This proposition was ultimately rejected, 
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and although it is nowhere in the Constitution explicitly stated that the judicial review 
of the state and federal law should serve as a procedure of resolving disputes between 
the national government and the states, it seems that most of the Founders accepted 
such a solution, at least quietly.21 J. Madison himself confirmed in Federalist no. 39 
that, according to the Constitution, controversies “relating to the boundary between 
the two jurisdictions”22 would be ultimately decided by the tribunal “established under 
the general government” which is the federal Supreme Court.
21 Jack N. Rakove, op.cit., 173-179.
22 The Federalist no. 39,242.
23 Allan R. Brewer-Carias. 2002. Venezuela. In Ann L. Griffiths (ed.). Handbook of Federal Countries 2002. 
Montreal & Kingston: McGill - Queens University Press, 360.
24 Switzerland had its own strong tradition of pre-federal arrangements. Although in establishing federa­
tion it was under the influence of the American example (creating a bicameral legislature is a primary 
example), it has to be treated exceptionally.
Out of the discussions, quarrels and sometimes bitter struggles that the Framers 
experienced during the Convention debates, a new system of government emerged. 
It stood as an example to be followed by other nations. Despite the differences among 
contemporary federal systems and their, sometimes considerable, deviations from the 
original, which will be discussed later in this paper, even today all federal systems, for 
the reasons given above, should be seen and judged as “variations of the American 
model.” The adoption of it was, however, not always an easy task.
Federalism adopted, rejected and twisted
The first country that adopted federalism as a governmental model was Venezuela in 
1810, thus becoming the second federation in history. It was followed by Mexico in 
1824, Switzerland in 1848 and Argentina in 1853. Venezuela’s adoption of federalism 
was directly influenced by the US constitution, all the more because it was justified by 
territorial conditions similar to those that had stimulated the creation of the American 
federation, “in particular, the existence in the territory occupied by the former General 
Captaincy of Venezuela of seven provinces isolated one from the other, and socially and 
politically configured in different ways.”23 The reasons for establishing federal unions 
were similar both in Mexico and in Argentina, though in the latter, the establishment 
of the federal republic was preceded by a long and bloody struggle between “Unitar­
ians” and federalists. Both of these countries adopted a federal structure undoubtedly 
modeled on the American example.
Out of these early experiments in implementing federalism almost all of them, with 
the notable exception of Switzerland, turned out to be extremely unsuccessful.24 The 
Venezuelan federation survived only a year and its collapse marked the beginning of 
a more than decade long war of independence. Federalism in Mexico was eliminated, 
after eleven years, in the constitution of 1835. Argentina remained a federal republic 
but in name only, given the steady centralization of power in Buenos Aires, fuelled 
additionally by succeeding dictatorial regimes “that became a common feature in 
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the political history of the country [and] continued to centralize the power of the 
national government.”25
25 Viviana Patroni. 2002. Argentina. In Ann L. Griffiths (ed.), op.cit., 19.
26 Simón Bolívar. 2003. The Cartagena Manifesto: Memorial Addressed to the Citizens of New Granada 
by a Citizen from Caracas. In David Bushnell (ed.). El Libertador. Writings of Simón Bolivar. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 6.
27 J. Smith. 1988. Canadian Confederation and the Influence of American Federalism. Canadian Journal 
of Political Science. 21, 460-461.
Those early attempts proved at least that the new system invented by the Americans 
was not free from weaknesses (which by the time Venezuela was established as a fed­
eration showed themselves quite clearly in the United States) and that it was definitely 
not a panacea and did not provide a perfect solution. Simón Bolívar, one of the most 
ardent admirers of the federal system, which he described as “the most perfect and 
most suitable for guaranteeing human happiness in society,” at the same time blamed 
it most for the collapse of the Venezuelan republic, claiming that “what most weakened 
the government of Venezuela was the federalist structure it adopted.”26 Federalism 
failed in the emerging states of Latin America because it weakened the government 
too much. This weakness of the national government in a federal union was in effect 
responsible for internal instability and consequently ungovernability of the federation. 
This is somehow ironic, given the fact that the intention of the American Founders was 
exactly to establish a strong national government.
John A. Macdonald had to remember very well these examples of unsuccessful 
federal experiments when the British colonies in North America planned to be united 
under the form of a federal union.
Uniting the colonies in any other form was virtually impossible for many reasons. 
It would not resolve the problem of the French community and it would not be accept­
able for the maritime provinces strongly attached to their autonomy. Federalism was 
thus unavoidable, which, however, did not mean that it was going to be an American 
model of federal union. The participants of the Quebec Conference, or at least the 
majority of them, were highly critical of the American model, blaming it for stimulat­
ing the centrifugal forces that led, exactly at the time when Canadians started their 
own federalizing process, to the most serious crisis of the American federation ended 
ultimately by the outbreak of the Civil War. For John A. Macdonald, the main architect 
of the Canadian federation, the cure for these maladies was to strengthen the central 
government at the expense of provincial autonomy. Therefore, the national government 
needed be empowered with the instruments that would make possible the control of the 
provinces and could be utilized to restrain their possible excesses. Only a strong central 
power with provinces subordinated could, in his opinion, ensure the endurance of the 
federation in the long run. The Canadian founders were particularly preoccupied with 
two features of American federalism, “state sovereignty and the residual power, and 
they were convinced that by reversing US practice in relation to them, they could avoid 
the disintegrative pressures to which federal arrangements appeared vulnerable.”27 In 
consequence, the Canadians adopted from their southern neighbor the idea of a federal 
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union, but organized it in a different manner than their American predecessors. It was 
probably the first example of “creative adoption” of federalism, even more so because 
Canada was also the first state in history that combined federalism with a parliamentary 
and monarchical system of government. For this reason alone, some features of the 
American model could not be simply implemented.28
28 Equal representation of the provinces in the Senate was out of the question because of the French com­
munity concentrated in one province - Quebec. In the parliamentary system the upper chamber could 
not be embodied in similar powers as in the presidential system based on the mechanism of checks and 
balances. Because the Canadian constitution was an act of British parliament, the amendment procedure 
seemed to be unnecessary, the parliament in Westminster was the sole body empowered to change it.
29 Paul B. Waite (ed.). 1969. The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada/1865. Toronto/Montreal: 
McClelland and Stewart, 147, 148.
" See Juliusz Bardach and Hubert Izdebski. 1980. L’Etat fédéral et le principe fédératif en histoire. Czaso­
pismo Prawno-Historyczne, XXII, 333.
51 Thomas Fleiner-Gerster. 1992. Federalism in Australia and in Other Nations. In Gregory Craven (ed.). 
Australian Federation. Towards the Second Century. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 16.
32 Gordon S. Wood. 1998. The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787. Chapel Hill-London: Uni­
versity of North Carolina Press, 475.
In the end, Canadians established a highly centralized federal union, somehow ironi­
cally calling it a Confederation. Those who were opposed to the scheme, such as Jean 
Baptiste Eric Dorion, pointed out that the deviations from the original model were so 
immense that in fact it was “not a Federal union (...), but a Legislative union in disguise.” 
J. B. E. Dorion argued that “federalism [was] completely eliminated from this scheme, 
which centre[d] everything in the General Government.” He, clearly referring to the 
American model, defined federalism as “the union of certain states, which retain their full 
sovereignty in everything that immediately concerns them, but submitting to the General 
Government questions of peace, of war, of foreign relations, foreign trade, customs and 
postal service.” However, in the Canadian scheme “all is strength and power, in the Federal 
Government; all is weakness, insignificance, annihilation in the Local Government.”29
But there was another feature of the American federal system making its adoption 
problematic for other nations. Although Canadians, quite surprisingly actually, did 
not pay much attention to it, republicanism, which became closely associated with 
federalism, had been decisive for the rejection of federalism in Brazil in 183430 and 
later would constitute a serious obstacle for the Australians who were more than eager 
to adopt federalism in its “pure” American version.
For the emergence of federalism it was important that the states were republics, 
that they established governments based on popular sovereignty and that as a result 
the American confederation “did not form even symbolic monarchical system.”31 Fed­
eralism was from the beginning merged with republicanism. In fact, in the call for the 
reform of the Articles of Confederation and the creation of a new national government, 
what was at stake was a preservation of republicanism in America. In the eyes of the 
nationalists, a federal union of a new kind was supposed to constitute the final act of the 
revolution. In the words of Gordon S. Wood: “Only a new continental republic that cut 
through the structure of the states to the people themselves and yet was not dependent 
on the character of that people could save Americas experiment in republicanism.”32 *In 
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Federalist no. 10, J. Madison strongly underlined those correlations between federal­
ism and republicanism stating that an extensive republic had obvious advantages over 
a small one, and that the maladies incident to the republican government could be 
much better treated in a large than in a small republic. Size and proper structure of the 
Union were the best “remedies” for “diseases” of the republican government, therefore 
“according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans ought to be 
our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting characters of federalists.”33 This neces­
sary concomitance of federalism and republicanism was also obvious to S. Bolivar.34 
According to Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, in this combination of federalism and repub­
licanism lay “the revolutionary character of the United States Constitution.”35 In light 
of this, the question was how could federalism ever be combined with a monarchical 
system, when being a federalist equaled being a republican?
” The Federalist no. 10. In Clinton Rossiter (ed.), op.cit., 79.
” Simón Bolívar, op.cit., 6.
35 Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, op.cit., 19.
36 Graham Maddox. 2004. James Bryce: Englishness and Federalism in America and Australia. Publius: 
The Journal of Federalism, 34, 57.
37 John S.F. Wright. 2001. Anglicizing the United States Constitution: James Bryce’s Contribution to Aus­
tralian Federalism. Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 31, 119.
38 Ibidem, 125.
This was the problem that the Australian founders faced when they were preparing 
unification of the colonies in the form of a federation. Although the obvious example 
was the Canadian federation, they soon rejected it as being too centralized. They looked 
fondly at the American model, but how could they adopt it when American federalism 
was seen as a purely republican design? It appeared that it would be possible only if 
the connection between the institutions of American federalism and its philosophical 
or ideological background could be somehow severed. In other words, the Australian 
founders had to look at American federalism in complete isolation from its ideological 
origins. It was exactly what happened in Australia and it was possible thanks to James 
Bryces The American Commonwealth. The Australian founders obtained knowledge 
about the federal system not from The Federalist but rather from J. Bryces opus. And 
what was characteristic for his approach to the American constitution was the refusal 
to acknowledge its republican background.36 Instead, he argued that the institutions 
of American federalism were developments of the older state constitutions, which, 
in their turn, evolved from the British constitution. His conclusion was that in fact 
federalism had more to do with the British constitutional tradition than with repub­
licanism. In this way J. Bryce “gave the Australian founders an opportunity to look at 
American institutions in isolation from their republican overtones.”37 The adoption of 
the American model was not complete in Australia. It could not be, given the fact that 
along with federalism, a parliamentary system of government was established. There­
fore, for example, the Senate had to be transformed “from a republican instrument of 
checks and balances, to a utilitarian device of democratic review.”38
Australia provided an example of another problem in adopting federalism. To be 
accurate, it has to be remembered that in fact the difficulty that Australian founders 
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had in accepting federalism with its ideological, republican baggage was more mental 
or psychological than real. After all, what they did establish was a fully democratic state 
with monarchical symbols only, that, from the very beginning, were of very limited 
significance. On the other hand, the Commonwealth of Australia provided proof that 
American federalism could be successfully implemented elsewhere, something which 
prior to the establishment of the Australian federation was not very obvious, especially 
considering how quickly and nastily the federal experiment ended in Latin America.
Reception of American federalism 
in contemporary federal systems
Federalism became influential in the twentieth century when many countries were 
established as a federation or were transformed from the unitary to federal system. All 
federal constitutions are founded on the principles of the United States constitution where 
it refers to federalism, which means that all five characteristics of the federal system, 
pointed out above, are reflected in those constitutions. However, the degree to which they 
adopted American solutions varies significantly. In fact, only few federations are more 
or less copies of the American. The reasons for this are numerous. First, federations with 
a parliamentary system of government could not adopt all the constitutional mechanisms 
from the US presidential system. Next, some of them had their own strong tradition of 
pre-federal arrangements reflected in their federal schemes (Germany with Bundesrat is 
perhaps the best example). Then, there were particular local circumstances, such as the 
existence of ethnic minorities that determined adoption of different solutions, for example 
asymmetrical arrangements as in India, Malaysia and, to a much lesser extent, Canada. 
Lastly, federalism fit very well into the common law system, but was problematic in the 
hierarchical legal system of civil law that existed in continental Europe. Therefore, “in 
order to establish legal system based on both federal and state law, European countries 
had to adapt a two-tiered system to the centralized doctrine of Continental law,” which 
in turn led to the development of executive federalism that is a system where federal law 
is executed by state civil servants, instead of federal agencies.39
” Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, op.cit., 22.
“ Ibidem, 23.
This leads to the conclusion that even though federalism, as a way of organizing the 
governmental system, turned out to be highly attractive to numerous states of different 
historical, legal and cultural backgrounds on all the continents (especially although 
not exclusively) to large countries and those composed of minorities, the American 
federal system was not attractive to the same degree.
As T. Fleiner-Gerster points out, “perhaps history, more than theory, explains dif­
ferences among federal systems.”40 The American federation was established by the 
unification of separate, sovereign political entities. The way a federal union is instituted 
determines the mode of power division between the two orders of government in the 
federation. When it is created by unification, the constituent parts transfer some por­
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tion of their sovereign powers to the national government and keep the rest of them. 
In effect the constitution, as in the United States, contains only a list of national pow­
ers (delegated) and leaves all the rest (residual powers) to the federated entities. Only 
Argentina, Australia and to some extent Mexico followed the United States’ example, 
while other federations set up different patterns, which varies enormously. In this area 
the influence of American federalism appears thus to be of limited importance.
Federations that emerged from the process of decentralization tend to favor the 
central government, not only in the pattern of division of powers but also in limiting 
the autonomy of federated entities. Such limits in the United States constitution are few. 
Alongside the supremacy clause there is the republican form of government that federa­
tion is obliged to guarantee to the states and indirect indication that in all states there 
have to be both legislatures and executives. In most contemporary federal systems the 
limits to federated entities’ autonomy are much more developed. In the extreme cases 
of Brazil and Republic of South Africa and to a lesser extent Austria and Argentina, 
federal constitutions not only establish institutions of state or provincial governments 
but also regulate in detail their organization, powers and mutual relations.
By establishing the Senate with equal representation of the states, the American 
founders invented a new justification for bicameral legislature. The function of the 
second chamber was representation of the interest of federated entities in the national 
government. Most federations have, in fact, bicameral parliaments, although there are 
some exceptions to the rule.41 Nevertheless, in this area the impact of the American 
example is probably the strongest, especially when we consider that among the federa­
tions there were some countries with no tradition of bicameralism whatsoever. Switzer­
land provides an example. Seven out of seventeen federal second chambers,42 excluding 
the US Senate, follow the American pattern of equal state representation, two more 
(Malaysia, Mexico) with some modification.43 At first American senators were elected 
by state legislatures. Nowadays five federations use this method of electing state or pro­
vincial representatives.44 Even before the 17th amendment was passed, the Australian 
founders decided that the Senate would be elected directly by the states’ population. 
It is therefore not an entirely American idea. However, it is noteworthy that Australia 
and the United States, which first introduced direct elections, are now imitated by five 
other federations.45 Nowhere outside the United States was the electoral college system 
introduced, nevertheless in some federations the constituent parts are also involved in 
the procedure of electing the head of state, most notably in India and Germany.
41 In five contemporary federations there are unicameral parliaments. These are: St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Micronesia, Comoros, Venezuela and the United Arab Emirates.
42 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Republic of South Africa.
43 And it has to be also remembered that in the unicameral legislatures of Micronesia and Comoros, where 
distinct representation of the states and islands, respectively, is provided, they are represented by equal 
numbers of members.
44 Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, India and Pakistan.
45 Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico and Switzerland.
Judicial review as a procedure for resolving disputes within the federal structure 
was adopted almost universally, although it is present in two forms. In common law 
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federations the Supreme Court is the final umpire in such disputes, although each ordi­
nary court can decide on constitutional issues. On the other hand, civil law federations 
created specialist courts or tribunals (constitutional courts).46 The only exceptions are 
Switzerland, where the disputes are resolved by referendum and Ethiopia where the 
second chamber of national legislature (House of the Federation) is competent to rule 
on such disputes. Even in Canada, where originally the right of the federal government 
to reserve and disallow provincial legislation was to provide appropriate procedure, the 
courts from the beginning, without any doubt modeled after their US counterparts, 
found themselves entitled to rule on constitutional issues including, naturally, also those 
concerning division of powers between the federation and the provinces.
46 See Cheryl Saunders. 1995. Constitutional Arrangements of Federal Systems. Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism, 25, 66-67.
47 Ronald L. Watts. 2008. Comparing Federal Systems. Montreal 8c Kingston: McGill - Queens University 
Press, 162-163.
48 The exception is, of course, the United Arab Emirates with its unicameral legislature, which is wholly 
composed of members nominated by the Emirates.
The American constitution can be amended only with the consent of the Congress, 
expressed by special majority, and approval of the special majority of the states act­
ing through their legislatures. This mode of constitutional amendment procedure has 
been quite influential. The acceptance of the constitutional amendment by the special 
majorities of the constituent units, which are thus directly involved in the procedure, is 
required in Canada (in some cases there is no need for provincial consent, in others every 
province has to approve constitutional amendment), Nigeria and Russia, and by simple 
majorities in India and Mexico. In these federations the constituent parts act through 
their legislatures, but in Switzerland and Australia the consent of the special majority of 
the cantons and states, respectively, is also mandatory. However, it can only be provided 
directly by the people through the referendum process. Other federations did not fol­
low the American example, requiring only special majorities in the national legislatures 
for amending their constitutions, therefore excluding the direct action of the federated 
entities. Examples are Germany, Brazil, Austria, Malaysia (for most amendments), the 
Republic of South Africa, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.47 In these federations 
the consent of the constituent part is usually given through the second chambers where 
they are represented.48 None the less, all contemporary federal constitutions modeled 
their amendment procedures on the principle of the United States constitution, which 
states that the amendment cannot be accomplished by the unilateral action of one order 
of government, because none of them is subordinated to another.
Conclusion
Although he vigorously defended the constitutional scheme that originated in Philadel­
phia, James Madison, who can be fairly seen as its main architect, was all but satisfied 
and optimistic. He was deeply concerned that the Union, which he helped to create, 
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would not survive if the national government became too weak. The Union not only 
survived but this particular constitutional structure erected by the Founders through 
a difficult process, has, in time, become an invention that turned out to be highly 
attractive to numerous nations all over the world. Federalism thus became the great 
contribution made by the Founders to the science of politics and government. The 
words “federal” and “federalism” changed their meanings forever. From now on they 
described the kind of political system established at the end of the eighteenth century 
on the eastern seaboard of North America. Therefore, it is perfectly justified to assert 
that ’’all modern federal polities, whether their people like to be reminded of it or not, 
are the spiritual children of the founding fathers of the Philadelphia Convention.”49
*’ Winston G. McMinn. 1994. Nationalism and Federalism in Australia. Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 45.
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